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Paper addresses the recent initiatives of EU Lisbon Agenda to increase level of R&D 
expenses in EU Member States by studying firm-level panel data in most advanced transition 
economy, Slovenia. Previous empirical literature - mainly cross-sectional - has tested the 
demand-pull hypothesis and found in overall that R&D expenses may be driven by output. 
Using a panel of over 150 Slovene firms over the 1996-2000 period, and checking for fixed 
effects, time, industrial and size dummies and for the path-dependent nature of R&D, we also 
find a significant role of sales in inducing R&D expenditures. Besides that data also confirm 
that internal funds and (un)successful bargaining for higher wages present significant 
variables for higher R&D expenses. However, at the micro level, the demand-pull, internal 
funds and bargaining effects play a varying role for the different sub-samples of firms. In 
particular, exporting firms, those which are liquidity-constrained, those not receiving public 
subsidies and those not heading a business group, seem to be particularly sensitive in deciding 
their R&D expenditures. R&D behavior at the firm level is modeled as error-correction model 
and estimated in system GMM specification. 
 






“We need more research and development, with more efficiency and better 
coordination. We need to work together on the European scale to ensure that research is 
translated into innovative products and services, which feeds into growth and jobs,” the head 
of EU Commission J.M.Barroso said when the annual progress report (2006) on “Growth and 
Jobs” strategy was published. This is likely different language that European politicians use in 
the present time compare to well known Lisbon strategy (2000) with its popular phrase of 
Europe becoming the most competitive economy by 2010. However, the new language 
doesn't diminish the very fact on smaller R&D expenditures of most European countries 
compare to USA and Japan. Although some European countries achieved a much higher share 
of R&D expenditure in GDP (Finland 3.48%, Sweden 3.86% in 2005) than the USA (2.67% 
in 2004) and Japan (3.2% in 2003), the EU-25 average in 2005 was 1.85%.   
Transition countries are due to the historical reasons even much more behind. Being 
among the most developed transition countries, and one of the most prepared to carry out the 
Lisbon goals (Murray, Wanlin, 2005), Slovenia declared a goal to increase public R&D 
expenditure from the current 0.55% to 1% of GDP by 2008 and private expenditure from the 
current 0.90% to 2% of GDP by 2010.1 This is quite an ambitious goal, especially when we 
look on private sector increase. Since other countries set similar goals, in this paper we intend 
to show the mechanisms behind the processes of R&D accumulation in the private sector and 
feasibility of such goals.     
Our study is of interest for four principal reasons. First, we provide empirical evidence on 
R&D activity at the firm level in transition economy in the sound analytical framework. 
Second, our study examines systematically the effect on R&D-related performance of 
different types of privatization and subsequent ownership, an issue that has not received any 
                                                 
1 This is in accordance with the Barcelona meeting (March 2002) on the implementation of Lisbon strategy,. 
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attention in the literature so far. Third, we analyze the effect of specific institutional structure, 
characterized by employee representation on the Supervisory Boards of firms and 
underdeveloped financial markets, and provide a test of its effects on R&D expenses.2 Finally, 
we are able to assess whether a firm’s exposure to foreign versus only domestic markets 
affects its R&D investment. If the barriers between domestic and export markets are low, the 
relationship between export orientation and R&D performance should be weak or nonexistent 
because both types of firms are exposed to world competition. The transition economy 
context hence provides a fruitful setting in which to examine the hypothesis that countries that 
expose their firms to world competition induce similar economic behavior on all firms, 
irrespective of their structural and institutional differences. 
 Our results indicate that firms plan R&D activities in the strategic (long-term) nature, 
while short run effects are almost non existing. Long run elasticity of R&D investment was 
found to be significant with respect to current sale (accelerator effect) and cash flow. 
Accelerator effect proves that firms treat future profits as motives for R&D expenditures. 
Cash-flow effect is smaller but significant, indicating that Slovene firms finance the prevalent 
part of R&D expenditures from retained profits and past accumulation. Capital markets are of 
minor importance in providing finance resources for R&D activities.  Finally, the bargaining 
hypothesis was confirmed on the long run indicating the existence of trade-off between R&D 
investment and higher wages. Firms oriented more on domestic than foreign markets invest 
the same and the method of privatization or supervisory board structure also doesn’t have any 
effect on subsequent R&D investment. Surprisingly, firms with higher proportion of insider 
owners invest significantly more in R&D activities. On the base of our research we conclude 
that in present institutional environment in Slovenia it is not likely to expect a substantial 
increase of R&D expenditures in the private sector of the economy.   
                                                 
2 Both are important institutional features of a number of new twelve countries in the European Union (EU). 
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical framework of 
firm level R&D investment, the corresponding estimating equations and institutional setting 
of Slovene economy, while in Section 3 we describe the data and variables that we use. In the 
fourth section we present the methodology, followed by the section five where the results of 
our empirical tests are outlined. In Section 6 we draw our conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical and institutional settings 
R&D activities in firms in transition economies are usually studies within the context 
of restructuring they faced after break down of old regime. (See, for example, Grosfeld and 
Roland (1997), Aghion, Blanchard and Carlin (1997) and Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and 
Rapaczynski (1999).) The importance of investment in fixed capital has been documented in 
the business and economics literatures. The literature on investment in soft capital, such as 
R&D, is more recent but equally important. In the conceptual framework R&D expenses are 
included in the framework of the production function if output is a homothetic function of 
physical capital and technology acquired through R&D (Mairesse, Sassenou, 1991) and one 
may replace output by sales revenue in the production function since part of R&D expenses 
represents the development of new products (Griliches, 1986). In order to capture these 
aspects of strategic restructuring empirically, we estimate an investment equation that 
incorporates firm’s output demand (demand side), internal funds (supply side) and the 
bargaining about -- tradeoff between -- investment and wages (Fazzari et al., 1988, and 
Prasnikar and Svejnar, 2000). We first outline the theoretical framework that underlies our 
estimating equations. 
2.1. Theoretical setting and estimating equations 
Following the neoclassical model of static factor demand, the long-run desired level of 
the knowledge stock is specified as a log-linear function of output and the user cost of capital. 
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Letting gt denote the natural log of the desired knowledge stock in period t, ty  denote the log 
of output and tj  denote the log of the user cost of capital, yields: 
ttt jyg σα −+=                          (1) 
In the absence of any adjustment costs or barriers to immediate adjustment, this would 
be the optimal quantity of R&D capital for a profit maximizing firm with constant returns to 
scale CES production function. This formulation nests the possibility of a fixed capital-output 
ratio ( 0=σ ) and a Cobb-Douglas production function ( 1=σ ). However, it is not realistic to 
assume that the employer’s expectations about future factor and product prices are static. In 
reality it makes sense to assume that the best employers can do is to take account of the 
amount of product factors currently employed and the likely future path of demand for 
products they produce. As the adjustment process may be complex, the usual way to proceed 
is to nest expression (1) within a general autoregressive-distributed lag (ADL) dynamic 
regression model, and use a “general-to-specific” specification search to let the data determine 
the relevant dynamics within our samples.  
If we assume that adjustment process follows second-degree auto-regressive 
distributed lag process, the specification can be rewritten as follows: 
281762514322110 −−−−−− ++++++++= ttttttttt jjjyyyggg ααααααααα                      (2) 
and re-parameterize the model in an error correction form: 
+Δ++Δ+Δ++Δ+Δ−+=Δ −−− 17661433110 )()()1( tttttt jjyygg αααααααα  
tttt jyyg εαααααααααα ++++−−−+++−−−− −−− 2876221543221 )())1(())(1(  
        (2’) 
The main challenge in estimating R&D investment models is to estimate the value of 
intangibles that the firm is using in the production process. The error correction model avoids 
this problem because it does not require knowing the stock of soft capital. Following Hall 
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(1992), Bond et al. (2003) and Bond and Van Reenen (2002) for the case of R&D expenses, 
we assume that for a firm in a steady state the current level of R&D capital stock (Gt) is given 
by 
1)1( −+= tt GG υ ,                         (3) 
 where υ  represents growth rate of R&D capital stock. Correspondingly, expenditures in 
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where tr  is the log of R&D capital expenditures, tg  is the log of R&D capital stock and δ  is 
the firm-specific depreciation rate. If this steady state approximation is reasonable, 
unobservable tg  can be replaced in equation (2’) by the observed tr , incorporate the first 
term of (5) by a firm-specific intercept and assuming that the variation in the user cost of 
capital can be captured by additive year-specific ( tμ ) and firm-specific ( iη ) effects (Bond, 
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where δ  is the firm-specific depreciation rate. 
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Equation (6) requires that 04 <ρ  to be consistent with error correcting behavior 
implying that R&D capital stock above its desired level is associated with lower future R&D 
investment. 
Equation (6) implicitly assumes that the firm operates in a perfect capital market in 
that it may obtain as much external capital as it wants at the same rate as that at which it can 
lend its internal funds. However, the underdeveloped nature of the capital markets in the 
transition economies and the existence of informational asymmetries between banks and firms 
suggest that firms may face constraints on external financing (Meyendorff and Thakor, 2002). 
If this is the case, the amount of any given firm’s investment will vary positively with the 
amount of funds that it can generate internally.4 It is customary to test for this phenomenon by 
augmenting equation (6) with a proxy for these internal funds, such as profits (e.g., Lizal and 
Svejnar, 2002, Domadenik, Prasnikar, Svejnar, 2003).  
Moreover, it is also important to assess the extent to which employee ownership 
and/or control affect the firm’s investment. The literature on participatory and labor-managed 
firms has for a long time debated the existence and seriousness of the so called “under-
investment problem,” allegedly brought about by the short (less than infinite) time horizon of 
individual workers in these firms. The basic argument is that worker-insiders, unlike diversified 
capital owners (outsiders), prefer to distribute enterprise surplus as current labor income and 
fringe benefits rather than reinvesting it in the firm for future growth (e.g., Furubotn and 
Pejovich, 1970, and Vanek, 1970). More recently, Blanchard and Aghion (1995) have followed 
this thesis by arguing in the transition context that insider-dominated firms may not generate 
resources needed for restructuring activities such as R&D investment.5 We hence use 
                                                 
4 An alternative interpretation of the case when the firm’s level of investment varies positively with internal 
funds – one that is consistent with perfectly functioning capital markets -- is that the firms can borrow 
investment funds at a constant market rate but that this rate exceeds the rate at which the firms can lend because 
of transaction costs (e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Almeida and Campello (2002)). 
5 In the context of the transition to a market economy, the investment-wage issue is especially important. The lifting 
of central controls and insider privatization gave workers significant powers in enterprises in countries such as 
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explanatory variables that permit us to assess the extent to which (a) there is bargaining over 
the internally generated funds that the firm could use for investment versus expenditures on 
wages, salaries and bonus payments and (b) employee ownership and/or control affect 
negatively the firm’s investment. 
To tackle the issue of bargaining, we follow the method used by Domadenik, 
Prasnikar and Svejnar, 2003, and let profit π to be defined as revenues Q minus labor costs 
WL and all non-labor costs H: π = Q – WL – H. Moreover, let Wa be the reservation (best 
alternative) wage and WL - WaL be the difference between the actual and reservation level of 
wage bill (labor cost).6 The extent to which employee-insiders earn more than their 
reservation income (WL - WaL > 0) reflects their ability to appropriate what would otherwise 
be the firm’s surplus. WL - WaL is hence an outcome of bargaining over the firm’s internally 
generated funds. Since we analyze strategic decisions over labor cost as well as soft capital 
investment in several areas, we include expenditures on research and development IRD, 
expenditures on marketing IM and expenditures on training IT in the internal funds that are 
subject to bargaining.7 The measure of internal funds that we use is therefore given by  
πa = π + (WL - WaL) + (IRD+IM+IT) = Q - WaL – H + IRD+IM+IT  
We include πa as a proxy for the internal funds variable in an augmented form of 
equation (6) and interpret the estimated coefficient on πa as a measure of the extent to which 
firms with more internal funds invest more than others, ceteris paribus.  
To answer the question, whether employee ownership and control have a negative 
effect on firm’s investment, we include as explanatory variables EXTPRIV, OWNERFUNDS, 
OWNERPIFS, OWNERFIRMS, OWNEROTHER, and EXTBOARD, defined above.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Russia, Ukraine and some other newly independent states (NIS). Moreover, with the inability of many firms in these 
economies to pay wages, the tradeoff between using the firm’s value added for financing investment versus paying 
wages and fringe benefits has become particularly acute. 
6 The reservation wage is defined as the wage below which employees would be unwilling to work in the firm. 
For its derivation look in Domadenik, Prasnikar, Svejnar, 2003. 
7 I.e., we capture the fact that employees may try to appropriate as income some funds that could otherwise be 
used for investment in R&D, marketing and training. We also implicitly assume that the reservation level of 
these expenditures is zero, which is not unrealistic in the context of the transition economies. 
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As in Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen (2003), the corresponding empirical 
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In equation (7), EXT is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm was privatized primarily 
to external owners and 0 if it was privatized primarily to insiders (managers and workers). 
Variables OWNERFUNDS, OWNERPIFS, OWNERFIRMS, and OWNEROTHER measure the 
percentage of a given firm’s shares that are owned by the state, privatization investment 
funds, other firms, and other (miscellaneous) owners, respectively. The miscellaneous owner 
category does not include the percentage of shares owned by insiders (workers, managers and 
retired workers) because this share of ownership is treated as the base, captured in the 
regression constant, against which the effects of other forms of ownership are being 
estimated. EXTBOARD measures the percentage of non-employee representatives on the 
Supervisory Board and HOMEMKT is the share of total sales going to the home (domestic) 
                                                 
8 The long run properties of this specification can be calculated as =YDRE /& 5ρ / 1ρ− , indicating long run elasticity of 
R&D investment with respect to sales; =CDRE /&  ( 76 ρρ + )/( 1ρ− ) for long run elasticity of R&D with respect to cash 
flow and =WDRE /& ( 98 ρρ + )/( 1ρ− ) for long run elasticity of R&D with respect to excess wages. 
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market9. Finally, INDUSTRY and REGION are industry and region dummy variables that 
control for industry-specific and region-specific conditions, respectively, while st is an annual 
dummy variable that controls for macroeconomic shocks. 
 
2.2. Institutional characteristics of Slovene economy in the nineties 
During the 1990s, Slovenia has pursued a gradual transition approach, with the most 
important reforms being macro stabilization, liberalization of trade and increase of product 
market competition. Price stabilization was achieved through restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies that brought down inflation from 21.5 percent per month in October 1991, when 
Slovenia launched its own currency, to an annual rate of 6-7 percent in the late 1990s. 
Slovenia also pursued a policy of managed flexible exchange rate and low import duties. This, 
together with an aggressive development of small and medium sized firms and government 
hardening of the budget constraints of the large socially-owned firms, has led to greater 
competition on the domestic market and improved competitive position on the western 
markets. Foreign capital has not played a significant part.  
Compared to the aggressive pursuit of consistent macro policies, the government has 
placed relatively less emphasis on the development of efficient labor and capital markets. The 
financial system as a whole has remained underdeveloped and it represents a minute part of 
corporate financing, despite the extensive restructuring of banks and the founding of a stock 
exchange. Privatization of firms to insiders or outsiders took place in the early to mid 1990s, 
relying on a combination of voucher and manager-worker buy-out methods, and resulting in 
primarily insider (internal) or outsider (external) ownership.10 The varying degrees of 
                                                 
9 The inclusion of the variable capturing the share of firm’s sales on the domestic market reflects the hypothesis that 
exporting firms that face greater competition and hence need to invest more than their domestically oriented counterparts in 
order to succeed in their restructuring activities. 
 
10 The 1992 Privatization Law allocated 20 percent of a firm’s shares to insiders (workers), 20 percent to the 
Development Fund that auctioned shares to investment funds, 10 percent to the National Pension Fund, and 10 
percent to the Restitution Fund. In addition, in each enterprise the workers' council or board of directors (if one 
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ownership of firms by investment privatization funds, state funds, other non-financial 
enterprises, employees, former employees, retirees, and other small shareholders makes 
Slovenia be an interesting laboratory for examining the effects of different forms of 
privatization and resulting patterns of ownership on restructuring and performance of firms. 
A potentially important aspect of corporate governance is the German-style 1993 Law 
on Workers’ Co-Determination that gives employees in companies with 500 to 1,000 (more 
than 1000) employees at least one-third (one-half) of seats on the Supervisory Boards of their 
firms. Since the Supervisory Board elects company management and also has other channels 
of influence, the employee-insiders potentially play an important role in the firms’ decision 
making process (Prasnikar and Gregoric, 2002). The role of employees was eventually 
changed significantly with the new Law on Codetermination (2002). Employee influence is 
has also been reflected in collective bargaining, which has permitted wages to vary across 
firms and defied government attempts to reign in real wage growth.  
 
3. Description of data and variables 
The sample contains 1996-2000 annual data on 157 largest Slovenian firms that were 
privatized in the 1993-1995 period. We hence observe the firms in the immediate post-
privatization period when they faced important decisions about investment in R&D. Most of 
these firms are registered as joint stock companies and in 2000 they generated 18 percent of 
total income and employed 9.8 percent of all employees among the firms registered in 
Slovenia. The data set is unique in that it provides information on a number of key variables, 
namely investment in R&D, marketing and training that are usually not available in balance 
sheets and income statements.  
                                                                                                                                                        
existed) was empowered to allocate the remaining 40 percent of company shares for sales to insiders (workers) 
or outsiders (through a public tender). Based on the decision on the allocation of this remaining 40 percent of 
shares, firms can be classified as being privatized to insiders (the internal method) or outsiders (the external 
method). 
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As may be seen from the summary statistics in Table 1, the variables display 
reasonable mean values and considerable variances. The average firm in the sample employs 
558 workers, achieves a ratio of sales to tangible capital of 9.6 and sells 58 percent of the 
value of its products on the domestic market. Gross investment in fixed capital and marketing 
expenditures are each equivalent to about 15 percent of tangible capital, while investment in 
R&D and externally provided training equal to 6 and 1 percent of tangible capital, 
respectively. Sampled firms covered more than 90 percent of the total R&D expenses from 
internal funds, while the percentage of loans slightly decreased and funds provided by 
governmental institutions is showing weak but positive upward trend.11 (See Table 2.) The 
majority of funds were spent on improvement of existing products and technologies (35.5 
percent in 2000 and 34.3 percent in 1996) and introduction of new products (30.5 percent in 
2000 and 32.6 percent in 1996). The share of basic research of new products and technologies 
exhibits downward trend indicating that firms are risk averse and spend their R&D funds on 
less risky projects. (See Table 3.) 
Slightly more than one-half of the firms were privatized primarily to insiders, and the 
average share ownership is 31 percent by insiders, 34 percent by investment funds, 21 percent 
by other firms and 13 percent by other owners. Finally, the average share of non-employee 
representatives on the supervisory boards of firms is 51 percent, confirming that employees 
have a significant overrepresentation on these boards comparing to their ownership share. 
The average intertemporal adjustments, not reported in a tabular form, include a 
decline in net employment of 4 and 2 percent in 1997 and 1998, respectively, followed by 1 
and 3 percent increase in 1999 and 2000, respectively, a reduction in the relative differential 
between actual and reservation wages from 37 percent in 1996 to 32 percent in 2000, a 14.8 
                                                 
11 Firms in manufacturing that report R&D activities in 1998 report that on average 92.7 percent of total R&D 
expenses was covered by internal funds, while the state contribution was 1.7%. The state contribution almost 
doubled in the period of 1996 till 1998 (increase by 90 percent) and amounted to 835 Mio tolars in 1998. 
(Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia, 2001) 
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percent annual increase in the stock of R&D capital12, a 5.2 percent annual increase in real 
sales per worker, and a 2 percent annual increase in labor costs. The average ownership share 
of insiders (employees, managers and retired employees) dropped significantly from 35 to 
25.3 percent,13 the share of investment funds from 37 to 31.2 percent,14 and the share of others 
(small shareholders, state and banks) from 13.9 to 13.3 percent,15 while the share of non-
financial firms increased considerably from 13.7 to 30.3 percent in the 1996-2000 period. 
Investment in fixed capital relative to sales increased from 5.8 in 1996 to 7.9 percent in 2000. 
In contrast, investment in R&D relative to sales increased only by 0.88 percent points from 
1.94 to 2.82 in the 1996-2000.  
 
4. Methodology 
By using micro-level panel data we are able to eliminate bias introduced by using 
aggregate investment data (Abel and Blanchard, 1986), reduce measurement error and take 
into account heterogeneity across firms and over time (e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994). The 
most important problem in estimating equation (7) is the endogeneity of the contemporaneous 
right hand side variables with respect to current and past disturbances. Moreover, due to the 
                                                 
12 We calculate the stock of intangible (knowledge) capital by using the permanent inventory method, originally 
proposed by Griliches (1979) for R&D capital. This method assumes that the current state of knowledge is the 
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capital. Substituting Git-1 by past expenditures on soft capital investment we obtain: 
....)1()1( 2
2
















it RG     
Since our focus is on the sample of firms that underwent ownership transformation in the middle of the 1990s 
and were operating in a labor-management system before the process of transition that started in 1991, it make 
sense to assume that the process of investing started in 1992, with the initial level of knowledge capital being 
zero. As our data start in 1996, we assume that the value of investment in knowledge capital in each year is 5% 
smaller than in the following year. Finally, we assume a depreciation rate of 15%. 
13 The average share of employees fell from 23.5 to 16 percent, while the managers’ share rose on average from 
3 to 4 percent. 
14 Within this category, the average share of state funds declined from 23.4 to 13.2 percent, while the share of 
private investment funds increased from 13.6 to 18 percent. 
15 Within this category, the average share of small shareholders fell from 3.8 to 3 percent, whereas the average 
ownership shares of banks and state remained the same at 1.3 and 2 percent, respectively. 
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inclusion of lagged dependent variable as a regressor and its clear correlation with the error 
term, the estimation of the parameters of the model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in 
levels will be inconsistent even if the errors are not serially correlated.  
Since the work of Arellano and Bond (1991), the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) techniques has been widely used in the estimation of dynamic panel data models. 
However, subsequent estimation of the finite sample performance of the GMM estimator have 
shown that it is substantially biased. One source of the bias arises from “weak instruments 
problem” (Staiger and Stock, 1997), while the second source of the bias is the relative number 
of instruments to sample size - the so called “many instruments problem”. Hahn and Hausman 
(2002), among others, have shown that the finite sample bias of 2SLS estimator is 
monotonically increasing in the number of instruments and leads to trade-off between the 
efficiency and the bias of the estimator. To overcome “weak instruments problem” Blundell 
and Bond (1998) proposed the system GMM estimator16 that has been widely used in 
empirical studies since then. Hayakawa (2005) shows that although using more instruments 
than the first differencing and the level estimators, even in the case of fixed N and T, system 
GMM is less biased than both (the first differencing and the level) preceding GMM 
estimators.  
Given the considerations above, we only present the system GMM estimates. We 
instrument ityΔ , 1/ −t
a
t Gπ  and 1/)( −− tt
a GLwwL 1 by using 3, −tiy , 4, −tiy , 43 / −− t
a
t Gπ  and 
43 /)( −−− tt
a GLwwL  in the differenced equation, while 2−Δ ty , 3−Δ ty , )/( 1−Δ t
a
t Gπ , 
                                                 
16 The system GMM estimator controls for the presence of unobserved firm-specific effects and for the endogeneity of the 
current-dated explanatory variables. It uses equations in first-differences, from which the firm-specific effects are eliminated 
by the transformation, and for which endogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be valid instruments provided 
there is no serial correlation in the time-varying component of the error terms. These differenced equations are combined 
with equations in levels, for which the instruments must be orthogonal to the firm-specific effects. Blundell and Bond (1998) 
show that in autoregressive-distributive lag models, first-differences of the series can be uncorrelated with the firm-specific 
effects provided that the series have stationary means. The validity of instruments is tested by using a Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions. 
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)/( 21 −−Δ t
a
t Gπ , )/( 32 −−Δ t
a
t Gπ , 1/)( −−Δ tt
a GLwwL , 21 /)( −−−Δ tt
a GLwwL  and 
32 /)( −−−Δ tt
a GLwwL were used as instruments in the levels equations.17 
 
5. Empirical results  
Looking at table 4 in appendix, error correction model of R&D investment fulfils all 
three underlying criteria: stability condition 11 <ρ , error correction term being negative and 
long-run returns being constant. As IV estimation departs from all three underlying criteria 
(possibly due to its poor precision), we will focus only on System GMM results.  
The error correction term is approximately equal to –0.221 indicating that a given 
output-capital gap is being closed via R&D investment at a rate of 22.1 percent per year18. 
Such high figure for adjustment of output-capital gap is probably a consequence of being in a 
transition period where firms had almost no R&D activities before 1994. Since data are 
showing high level of dependence from one year to another and I have relatively short time 
dimension of panel (5 years to estimate panel that includes two-year lags), the poor 
instruments resulted in very imprecise estimations with large standard errors.  
The estimated regression coefficients indicate a strong accelerator effect of current 
sales particularly on the long run. Long run elasticity of R&D investment with respect to 
current sale was estimated at level 0.76 indicating that 1 percent sales growth in the long run 
induces 0.76 percent R&D investment growth. Cash-flow hypothesis is being confirmed by 
the result that a change in the availability of internal funds, for example, by 1 percent, led to 
increase in R&D investment by approximately 0.04 percent in the long run. However, the 
                                                 
17 We are fortunate that our firm-level data come from two sources -- questionnaires that we administered to firms and the 
Slovenian Statistical Office. The questionnaire data relate to 1996-2000, but the Statistical Office data cover earlier years as 
well. We use the Statistical Office data for the lagged values of variables that we use as instruments and thus avoid the 
substantial loss of degrees of freedom that we would incur if we had to use 1996 data as instruments for 1997 values of 
variables.  
18 Hall et all, 2000, estimated the corresponding figure at a level of almost 14 percent for France and and 9 
percent for US in the period of 1979-1993, while Bond et al, 1999, reports 16 percent for UK and 6.4 percent for 
Germany in the period of 1973-1993. All reported error correction terms are lower for R&D comparing to fixed 
capital investment. 
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effect is smaller than in the case of accelerator effect but statistically significant. Finally, the 
bargaining hypothesis was also confirmed on the long run indicating the existence of trade-off 
between R&D investment and higher wages. Firms where the average salaries exceeded the 
reservation level in a higher extent, ceteris paribus, invested less in the period under study. 
The relevant studies on R&D investment in developed economies confirm very small 
or non-existent investment/cash flow sensitivity interpreting it as the fact that transitory cash 
flow movements are unlikely to have an important impact on a firm’s R&D expenditures, 
which are largely committed someway in advance. (See Hall et al, 1999, Bond et al, 2003.) In 
the case of Slovenia, we can observe high dependence of R&D expenditures (high correlation 
between variables measuring R&D expenditures, percentage of cash flow, sales and excessive 
wages with respect to stock of R&D capital) that signals that those expenditures are planned 
on permanent basis. But, on the other hand, in the environment of underdeveloped financial 
system firms, where there are almost no possibilities to get finance for more risky R&D 
projects, face serious financing constraints. As reported by sample firms, they finance more 
than 90 percent of R&D activities from internal funds. (See table 2 for detailed description 
and representation by year).  
Focusing on different subgroups of firms we find out that firms that had higher 
percentage of internal owners invest significantly more, ceteris paribus, comparing to those 
owned by other owners. The difference is the highest in the case of privatization investment 
funds (PIFs). The result is not surprising if we know that privatization investment funds enters 
in firms’ ownership structure through different privatization channels in order to serve their 
clients with best possible dividends. Short run orientation of such practices drop R&D 
expenses. On other hand, we should be careful in promoting employees’ ownership as being 
efficient for higher R&D investments. In the case of dispersed employees’ ownership 
managers retain the control over the firms. Obviously, managers who bargain well for higher 
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R&D investments against excessive wages and dividends, display significant increase in R&D 
expenses. The latter is confirmed also by a positive but insignificant sign on external 
supervisory board members’ composition usually being selected by managers. Interestingly, 
there are no statistically significant differences between firms that chose internal vs. external 




 “We need more research and development, with more efficiency and better 
coordination. We need to work together on the European scale to ensure that research is 
translated into innovative products and services, which feeds into growth and jobs,” the head 
of EU Commission J.M.Barroso said when the annual progress report (2006) on “Growth and 
Jobs” strategy was published. In the context of Lisbon strategy the presented paper deals with 
the topic that is in the centre of EU head officials. Moreover, as Slovenia being the most 
successful (former) transition economy usually presents the benchmark for late reformers the 
paper contributes to the literature on transition economies. 
The study and data used in study confirms that transition economies lack funds that 
can be used for R&D activities. Underdeveloped financial system doesn’t provide enough 
venture capital to support long-term R&D investments. Moreover, the model of collective 
bargaining at the state level and within particular firms are introducing bargaining over 
excessive cash flow desperately needed to finance R&D investments. Finally, the most 
worrisome fact is that firms either being privatized by state funds or privatization funds either 
being bought by other private investors, display significantly lower R&D activities comparing 
to firms that remained employees’ owned. However, we should be aware that in the case of 
dispersed ownership managers gain the substantial control over the firms’ operation. In the 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN ESTIMATING R&D INVESTMENT 
EQUATION  
Variable N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Description 
Lt 761 558.1 779.786 
Number of employees 
* Wt = yt/Lt  761 2138.843 709.355 Labor costs per employee 
* Qt/Lt 761 10136.77 10218.48 Sales per employee  
* KRD,t 691 637623 2046896 
Value of intangible R&D capital in 1996 prices 
IRD,t/K RD,t-1 
404 0.497 1.930 
R&D Investment/ capital in R&D-1 







Value added less reservation labor costs plus R&D expenses, 
marketing expenses and training  
expenses/ R&D capital-1 
(WL – WaL) t/K RD,t-1 
426 5.731 22.893 
Labor costs less reservation labor costs/ R&D capital-1 
lnQt 762 14.793 1.228 
Logarithm of Sales revenue 
lnKRD,t –lnQt 
529 -2.753 1.222 
Difference in Logarithms of R&D capital and sales revenue  
OWNERINSIDERSt 
738 0.318 0.229 
Ownership share of managers, workers and former employees  
OWNERFUNDSt 
738 0.343 0.219 
Ownership share of state funds and investment companies  
OWNERFIRMSt 
738 0.210 0.325 
Ownership share of other firms 
OWNEROTHERt 
738 0.128 0.184 
Ownership share of banks, small shareholders, state, unrealised 
internal buy-outs and other 
EXTBOARDt 
686 0.515 0.200 
Share of non-employees’ representatives on the Supervisory 
Board 
HOMEMKTt 
730 0.586 0.346 
Sales on domestic  market relative to total sales 
EXTPRIV 
780 0.488 0.500 
Privatisation dummy (1=external; 0=internal) 
* Variables are measured in 1000 SIT in 1996 prices. 
TABLE 2: STRUCTURE OF EXPENSES FOR R&D CAPITAL INVESTMENT BY SOURCE OF 



















1996 90.749 4.486 2.505 0.561 0.093 0.019 1.587 0.000 
1997 92.997 2.421 1.463 0.421 0.158 0.074 2.467 0.000 
1998 92.848 2.418 2.051 0.459 0.133 0.084 1.803 0.204 
1999 94.480 1.837 0.435 1.000 0.217 0.246 1.205 0.109 
2000 92.926 2.703 0.577 1.121 0.440 0.271 1.371 0.286 
TABLE 3: STRUCTURE OF R&D EXPENSES IN SAMPLED FIRMS IN PERIOD 1996-2000 
 
Year 
Basic research of new 
products and 
technologies 





1996 11.183 34.341 32.644 13.962 7.870 
1997 8.978 29.907 36.945 14.868 9.302 
1998 11.553 28.953 36.747 14.442 8.394 
1999 9.689 36.319 27.080 18.085 8.927 
2000 8.432 35.520 30.501 17.876 7.648 
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Δyt 2ρ  0.225 (0.161) 
Δyt-1 3ρ  -0.089 (0.102) 
(r - y)t-2 4ρ  -0.221 a (0.062) 
yt-2 5ρ  -0.052 (0.050) 
C t/G t-1 6ρ  0.001 (0.005) 
Ct-1/G t-2 7ρ  0.003 (0.003) 
Ct-2/G t-3 8ρ  0.006 (0.004) 
(WL – WaL) t/G t-1 9ρ  -0.017 (0.020) 
(WL – WaL)t-1/G t-2 10ρ  0.001 (0.006) 
(WL – WaL)t-2/G t-3 11ρ  -0.026 (0.019) 
EXT 12ρ  -0.004 (0.059) 
OWNERFUNDSt-1 13ρ  -0.157 (0.194) 
OWNERPIFSt-1 14ρ  -0.381b (0.172) 
OWNERFIRMSt-1 15ρ  -0.266c (0.154) 
OWNEROTHERt-1 16ρ  0.345b (0.161) 
EXTBOARDt-1 17ρ  0.104 (0.116) 
HOMEMKTt 18ρ  -0.105 (0.097) 
Year dummies Yes 
Constant 0ρ  0.556 (0.751) 
Industry dummies 19ρ  Yes 
Regional dummies 20ρ  Yes 
Short-run Elast. of R&D to Y 0.225 (0.161) 
Long-run Elast. of R&D to Y  0.761a (0.228) 
Short-run Elast. of R&D to C 0.001 (0.005) 
Long-run Elast. of R&D to C  0.048c (0.027) 
Short-run Elast. of R&D to W -0.017 (0.020) 
Long-run Elast. of R&D to W  -0.192b (0.074) 
Sargan p-value 0.65 
Note: 
1. a, b and c denote statistically significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% on a two tail test, respectively. 
2. System GMM refers to Arellano – Bond two-step estimator for dynamic panel data with finite sample correction 
(Windmeijer, 2005). 
3.. »Sargan« is a Sargan-Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions (p-value reported). 
